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TORT JURISDICTION IN A
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION: THE
LESSONS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
AND THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION
Ronald A. Brand
I. INTRODUCTION
The catalyst for this symposium is the undertaking at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law to negotiate a
multilateral convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.' Unlike some of the accompanying
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. This Article is an extended
version of the author's presentation at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium, "En-
forcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge," November 6, 1997. I benefitted
greatly from the comments of Linda Silberman on that presentation and the com-
ments of Arthur Hellman and Rhonda Wasserman on earlier drafts. I thank
Hannah Brody and Mark Walter for helpful research assistance and comments. All
errors remain my own.
1. Like other articles in this issue, this one is developed in the context of
the negotiations in The Hague Conference on Private International Law toward a
global convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments. See, e.g., Peter H. Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law to Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-
tion/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 7 (1998).
In May 1992, the United States proposed that the Hague Conference on
Private International Law take up the negotiation of a multilateral convention on
the recognition and enforcement of judgments. See Letter from Edwin D. William-
son, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary General,
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed
with Hague Conference document L.c. ON No. 15 (92)). In October 1992, a Work-
ing Group at The Hague, "unanimously recognized the desirability of attempting to
negotiate multilaterally through the Hague Conference a convention on recognition
and enforcement of judgments." HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE DIN LAW, CON-
CLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 184
(Prel. Doc. No. 19, 1992); see also HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW,
CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETING ON ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
(Hague Doe. L.c. ON No. 2 (93), 1993). The Seventeenth Session of the Hague
Conference, held in May 1993, decided to study the matter further through a
Special Commission Session. See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Final Act of the Seventeenth Session, May 29, 1993, pt. B(2), 32 I.L.M. 1134,
1145. In June 1994, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference recommended
the question be -included in the Agenda for the future work of the Conference at
its Eighteenth Session. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, CONCLU-
SIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF JUNE 1994 ON THE QUESTION OF THE REC-
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articles, this one focuses on a rather specific aspect of those
negotiations: the substance of a provision defining the accepted
jurisdictional basis for actions in tort brought against parties
from another contracting state.2 It is my belief that the ability
of the delegations in The Hague to achieve consensus on this
provision will indicate a great deal about their ability to com-
plete a successful multilateral convention. This belief, and the
resulting focus of this Article, follow from certain assumptions
I have formed during my participation in those negotiations.'
Those assumptions include the following:
OGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
MATrERS 13 (Prel. Doc. No. 1, 1994). In June 1995, the Special Commission on
General Affairs and Policy of the Conference recommended to the Eighteenth Ses-
sion of the Hague Conference (held in October 1996), that the proposal for a judg-
ments convention be adopted as one of the works of that Session. See HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, CONCLUSIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF
JUNE 1995 ON GENERAL AFFAIRS AND POLICY OF THE CONFERENCE 33 (Prel. Doc.
No. 9, 1995). In the Final Act of the Eighteenth Session of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law, it was decided "to include in the Agenda of the
Nineteenth Session the question of jurisdiction, and recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters." Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session, Oct. 19, 1996, pt. B(1), 35
I.L.M. 1391, 1405. The formal negotiations began in June 1997. See HAGUE CON-
FERENCE ON PRIVATE INt LAW, PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE
SPECIAL COMMISSION CONCERNING THE PROPOSED CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 3
(Info. Doc., Sept. 1997).
2. My focus here is neither that of a conflicts scholar, nor of an expert in
civil procedure. Unlike others providing articles for this symposium, I can claim
neither distinction. I come at this discussion from the perspective of a trade law-
yer; as one interested in the importance to a transactional practice of predictable
methods of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign
Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jagdeep Bhandari & Alan 0.
Sykes eds., forthcoming 1998); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages and the Recog-
nition of Judgments, 43 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 143, 143-86 (1996). I come with a
belief that the same economic concepts and theories that underlie our international
trade law system and the resulting efforts to create rules on the free movement of
goods, services, capital, intellectual property rights and persons, also support the
need for the free movement of judgments in order for that trade system to remain
true to its principles. Thus, my comments may be those of one on the periphery
in terms of the nuances of conflicts of laws and civil procedure. At the same time,
however, I hope they represent some of the concerns of the community that would
most benefit from enhanced multilateral rules on issues of both jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
3. The author is a member of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations, and
attended the meetings at The Hague in June 1994, June .1995, June 1996 and
June 1997.
TORT JURISDICTION
(1) The successful negotiation of a multilateral treaty
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments will not be an easy task.
(2) The parties participating in the work of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law
are ready and willing to try hard to make a suc-
cess of the negotiations, and are serious about the
effort.
(3) A successful convention must include rules on
direct jurisdiction-a simple convention will not
be acceptable.4
(4) For the United States, every provision of the con-
vention must be tested against the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses.
We can neither agree to assume jurisdiction over
foreign defendants on bases that would not be
within the limits of due process, nor accept an
obligation to recognize judgments based on juris-
dictional grounds that would not be acceptable
under the due process jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
(5) Lawyers and officials from other nations have
difficulty understanding the nuances and ambigu-
ities of our due process jurisprudence.
(6) A successful convention is likely to track the ex-
4. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the
Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INTIL L. 17, 27-28 (1998). A single
convention, like the 1971 Hague Convention, deals only with indirect jurisdiction
and applies only to the decision of the court asked to enforce a foreign judg-
ment-thus, jurisdiction of the court issuing a judgment is considered "indirectly"
by the second court in deciding whether to recognize the judgment of the issuing
court. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done Feb. 1, 1971, 1144 U.N.T.S. 249.
Double conventions, like Brussels and Lugano, provide direct jurisdiction rules
applicable in the court in which the case is first brought-thus addressing the
matter from'the outset and preempting the need for indirect consideration of the
issuing courts jurisdiction by the court asked to recognize the resulting judgment.
See infra note 5.
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ample of the Brussels Convention,' with rules of
direct jurisdiction, beginning with a single general
basis of jurisdiction-the domicile or habitual
residence of the defendant-and then providing
specific rules authorizing jurisdiction other than
in the state of the defendant's domicile or habitu-
al residence for certain types of cases.
(7) The convention should contain a separate basis of
jurisdiction for contract cases, but that jurisdic-
tional basis may be of limited importance given
the success of the New York Arbitration Conven-
tion,' and the tendency of well-advised parties in
transnational transactions to resort to arbitration
to settle contractual disputes.
Thus, the ability of the delegations at The Hague to reach
agreement on a separate jurisdictional basis for tort cases-one
that will allow a case to be brought other than in the state of
the domicile or habitual residence of the defendant--will be an
important test of whether there will be a successful convention.
This conclusion, and the assumptions supporting it, explain the
choice of tort jurisdiction as the topic for this Article. The par-
ticular focus here within that topic is explained by the roles
played by the U.S. and European Union legal systems as labo-
ratory examples for a multilateral convention.
The vague concept of due process has led to some confu-
sion, and less than complete certainty, in determining the
5. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention] (for the consolidated and updated version of this convention and the
Protocol of 1971, following the 1989 accession of Spain and Portugal, see 1990 O.J.
(C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413). The Convention is also subject to the
Convention on the Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland
and the Kingdom of Sweden, Nov. 29, 1996, 1997 O.J. (C 15) 1. See also Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, art. 62(1)(b), 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 24, reprinted in 28
I.L.M. 620, 638 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
6. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Arbitration Convention].
7. See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBI-
TRATION 281-367 (1993); Ronald A. Brand, Nonconvention Issues in the Preparation
of Transnational Sales Contracts, 8 J.L. & CoM. 145 (1988).
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existence of jurisdiction over foreign defendants in tort cases in
the United States.8 At the same time, what appears to be a
rather simple and functional rule in the Brussels Convention
has not always provided clear results.9 In this Article, I try to
determine whether the words used to describe and apply these
concepts and rules provide seemingly different semantic start-
ing points that lead to similar results in jurisdictional deci-
sions in tort cases in the United States and Europe, and if so,
whether it is possible to work from results back to harmonized
language upon which a rule of tort jurisdiction can be con-
structed for a multilateral convention. The analysis begins
with consideration of the history and current application of due
process to issues of in personam jurisdiction in the United
States, with particular focus on the language used to define
the relationships considered appropriate to the exercise of
jurisdiction. This is followed by a review of cases in which the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted Article 5(3) of
the Brussels Convention; again with attention to the language
used to distinguish when tort jurisdiction does and does not
exist. In the end, both the interpretations of due process in the
United States and of Article 5(3) in Europe focus on connecting
factors. While the concepts applied are expressed in different
language, the results are arguably similar. Thus, I reach the
conclusion that similar results exist from which it may be
possible to construct a jurisdictional rule appropriate to a mul-
tilateral treaty on jurisdiction and the recognition of judg-
ments.
8. For examples of some of the criticism of the results of the application of
due process concepts to jurisdiction, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back
Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for
Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1027 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, American
Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1993); Linda
J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Conflict of Laws Course: Adding a Com-
parative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 389 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Edwin Peel, Jurisdiction Under the Brussels Convention, in RES-
TITUTION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1, 20-31 (Francis Rose ed., 1995); J.G. Col-
lier, The Surprised Bank Clerk and the Italian Customer-Competing Jurisdictions,
55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 216, 217-18 (1996).
1998] 129
130 BROOK. J. 1NT'L L. [Vol. XXIV:1
II. DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS
A. Long-arm Statutes and Due Process Analysis
Analysis of in personam jurisdiction in U.S. courts involves
a two-step process. The first step is the application of the state
long-arm statute, to determine if there is statutory jurisdiction.
These statutes differ, but generally can be categorized as list-
type provisions, providing specific bases of jurisdiction,10 and
10. New York and Pennsylvania both have such statutes. Section 302 of the
New York C.P.L.R., entitled "Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries,"
provides in part:
(a) ACTS WHICH ARE THE BASIS OF JURISDICTION. As to a cause of action
arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or
administrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere
to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to per-
son or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered,
in the state, or,
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have con-
sequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 1990). Pennsylvania has a rather more complete
statute, which adds a constitutional limits provision:
§ 5322. BASES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS OUTSIDE THIS
COMMONWEALTH
(a) GENERAL RULE.-A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative
of a deceased individual who would be subject to jurisdiction under
this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent,
as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person:
(1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. With-
out excluding other acts which may constitute transacting
business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall
constitute transacting business for the purpose of this
paragraph:
(i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth
of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing
an object.
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(ii) The doing of a single act in this Commonwealth
for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit
or otherwise accomplishing an object with the inten-
tion of initiating a series of such acts.
(iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indi-
rectly into or through this Commonwealth.
(iv) The engaging in any business or profession with-
in this Commonwealth, whether or not such business
requires license or approval by any government unit of
this Commonwealth.
(v) The ownership, use or possession of any real
property situated within this Commonwealth.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this Common-
wealth.
(3) Causing harm or tortious injury by an act or omission
in this Commonwealth.
(4) Causing harm or tortious injury in this Commonwealth
by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth.
(5) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property
in this Commonwealth.
(6) (i) Contracting to insure any person, property, or
risk located within this Commonwealth at the time of
contracting.
(ii) Being a person who controls, or who is a direc-
tor, officer, employee or agent of a person who con-
trols, an insurance company incorporated in this Com-
monwealth or an alien insurer domiciled in this Com-
monwealth.
(iii) Engaging in conduct described in section 504 of
the act of May 17, 1921 (P.L.789, No.285), known as
"The Insurance Department Act of 1921."
(7) Accepting election or appointment or exercising powers
under the authority of this Commonwealth as a:
(i) Personal representative of a decedent.
(ii) Guardian of a minor or incompetent.
(iii) Trustee or other fiduciary.
(iv) Director or officer of a corporation.
(8) Executing any bond of any of the persons specified in
paragraph (7).
(9) Making application to any government unit for any cer-
tificate, license, permit, registration or similar instrument or
authorization or exercising any such instrument or authoriza-
tion.
(10) Committing any violation within the jurisdiction of this
Commonwealth of any statute, home rule charter, local ordi-
nance or resolution, or rule or regulation promulgated there-
under by any government unit or of any order of court or
other government unit.
(b) EXERCISE OF FULL CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OVER NONRESI-
DENTS.-In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdic-
tion of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all
persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to
BROOK J. 1NT'L L. [Vol. XXIV:I
the constitutional limits statutes, providing that a court in the
state can exercise in personam jurisdiction to the limits of the
Due Process Clause.1 The process of applying a list-type long-
arm statute is not unlike the application of the jurisdictional
rules of the Brussels Convention.'
The second step in the United States is the constitutional
analysis by which it is determined whether the exercise of
jurisdiction allowed by state statute in the particular case is
within the limits of the Due Process Clause. Because it usually
is a state long-arm statute that is being considered, it is the
Fourteenth Amendment we are most often concerned with."
persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the
United States and may be based on the most minimum contact
with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the
United States.
(c) SCOPE OF JURISDICTION.-When jurisdiction over a person is
based solely upon this section, only a cause of action or other mat-
ter arising from acts enumerated in subsection (a), or from acts
forming the basis of jurisdiction under subsection (b), may be as-
serted against him.
(d) SERVICE OUTSIDE THIS COMmONWEALTH.-When the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, service of process
may be made outside this Commonwealth.
(e) INCONVENIENT FORUM.-When a tribunal finds that in the in-
terest of substantial justice the matter should be heard in another
forum, the tribunal may stay or dismiss the matter in whole or in
part on any conditions that may be just.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (West 1981).
11. California has such a statute. It states, simply, that "[a] court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
12. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
13. Jurisdiction in the federal courts is governed by Rule 4(k) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule provides three principal jurisdictional authori-
zations:
(1) Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes a district court to borrow the
jurisdictional powers of state courts in the state where it is
located;
(2) Rule 4(k)(1)(D) confirms the availability of any applicable
federal statute granting personal jurisdiction; and
(3) Rule 4(k)(2) grants district courts personal jurisdiction to
the limits of the [Fifth Amendment] due process clause in
certain federal question cases.
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 172
(3d ed. 1996); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k). This most often results in the federal
court "borrowing" the state statute under Rule 4(k)(1)(A). See BORN, supra, at 172-
97.
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
Questions of Jurisdiction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'4 The discussion of due
process and jurisdiction in U.S. courts generally begins with
the 1877 case of Pennoyer v. Neff. 5 Justice Field's opinion
focused on a territorial approach to jurisdiction over the defen-
dant," enunciating what he considered to be "two well-estab-
lished principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an
independent State over persons and property:"
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclu-
sive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory .... The other principle.., is, that no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over per-
sons or property without its territory. 7
In the 1940 case of Milliken v. Meyer,"5 the Court expand-
ed this territorial scope beyond mere presence, holding that,
"[dlomicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent
defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for pur-
poses of a personal judgment."'9 This decision provides a di-
rect parallel to the structure of the Brussels Convention in
Europe, in which Article 2 sets out the general rule that the
courts of the state of the defendant's domicile shall have juris-
diction.0
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment was ratified on July 9,
1868.
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "Rightly or wrongly, Pennoyer v. Neff, linked American
jurisdictional law with the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, and how-
ever questionable that linkage may be, it has become part of American convention-
al wisdom." Friedrich K Juenger, Constitutionalizing German Jurisdictional Law,
44 AM. J. ComP. L. 521, 521 (1996) (book review) (footnotes omitted).
16. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise au-
thority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as
has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be
resisted as mere abuse.
17. Id. at 722.
18. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
19. Id. at 462.
20. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
1998]
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Understanding the current status of due process analysis
in jurisdictional decisions begins with two cases: International
Shoe Co. v. Washington21 and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.' International Shoe opened up jurisdiction be-
yond the territorial limits of Pennoyer, and World-Wide Volks-
wagen furnished language asserting anew the limits of due
process, but no longer in narrow terms of territoriality. While
neither case involved a defendant from outside the United
States, later cases involving foreign defendants have relied on
their analyses.
International Shoe involved an action brought in Washing-
ton state court by the State of Washington Office of Unemploy-
ment Compensation to collect delinquent contributions from a
Delaware corporation which had its offices in St. Louis, Mis-
souri. The subject corporation had no offices in Washington,
made no contracts there, and maintained no inventory in
Washington. It did employ eleven to thirteen salesmen in
Washington from 1937 to 1940, all of whose principal sales
activities were confined to Washington, and whose combined
commissions amounted to more than $31,000 per year."
While Pennoyer focused on the presence of the defendant
within the jurisdiction as a "prerequisite to its rendition of a
judgment personally binding him,"' International Shoe built
on Milliken v. Meyer, fundamentally altering the analysis by
permitting jurisdiction over nonresidents who were not served
while present in the state.' Finding something less than
presence necessary, the Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."26
The need for rules accommodating the fiction of the corpo-
rate personality led the Court to focus on the conduct of those
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313.
24. Id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
25. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
26. Id. at 313 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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acting on behalf of the corporation.' It noted two variables in
determining the constitutionality of jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent defendants. The first is the extent and intensity of the
defendant's activities in the forum state, and the second is the
connection between those activities and the cause of action."
"Continuous and systematic" activity supports general jurisdic-
tion over a defendant, allowing a court to consider actions
against the defendant whetyer or not they arise out of those
activities." A "single isolated" contact, on the other hand will
(at most) support only specific jurisdiction, with the require-
ment that the action arise out of the contact."0
One problem with the minimum contacts test of Interna-
tional Shoe is that there is no bright line rule for determining
when the threshold is crossed on the spectrum from activities
which are not sufficient to support jurisdiction to those which
are sufficient."' The expansion of jurisdictional concepts under
International Shoe was seen as "attributable to the fundamen-
27. Id. at 316.
28. Id. at 316-20.
29. Id. at 318 (citations omitted):
While it has been held ... that continuous activity of some sorts
within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation
be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity,... there have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state
were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities.
30. Id. at 317 (citations omitted):
"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when
the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no
consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of pro-
cess has been given .... Conversely it has been generally recognized
that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of
single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with
the activities there.
31. Id. at 319 (citations omitted):
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to
suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantita-
tive. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether
the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less .... Whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
tal transformation of our national economy over the years."32
With the "increasing nationalization of commerce," more and
more business was conducted across state lines, and modern
transportation "made it much less burdensome for a party sued
to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity."3 Like the Brussels Convention, state long-arm stat-
utes and the common law process in the United States devel-
oped protections for special classes of consumers, such as pur-
chasers of insurance policies, making it relatively easier for
them to prove the minimum contacts necessary to establish
constitutional jurisdiction over the defendant.'
In Hanson v. Denckla,"5 Chief Justice Warren retreated
somewhat from an expansive approach recognizing the role of
corporations and technological advances in transportation and
communication, reverting to a territorial orientation: "[lit is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."3 ' Therefore, the contacts with
the forum state must be the result of intentional conduct by
the defendant directed at that state.
The development of jurisdictional due process analysis
continued in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,37 a
products liability lawsuit brought in Oklahoma based on an
automobile accident that occurred in that state. An automobile
sold in New York to New York residents was being driven
through Oklahoma when the accident occurred. The plaintiff
sued both World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (a regional distribut-
er with its office in New York, who distributed to retail dealers
in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) and Seaway Volks-
wagen, Inc. (the retail dealer in New York from whom the car
had been purchased).3' Both of these defendants challenged
the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court.
32. McGee v. Intl Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
33. Id. at 223.
34. See, e.g., i&L
35. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
36. Id. at 253.
37. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
38. The plaintiffs also sued the manufacturer and Audi NSU Auto Union
Aktiengesellschaft, but those defendants did not take the issue of jurisdiction to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See id. at 288 n.3.
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World-Wide Volkswagen not only refined and applied the
minimum contacts test, but also reintroduced the concept of
reasonableness into the due process analysis:
[T]he defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such
that maintenance of the suit "does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'... The rela-
tionship between the defendant and the forum must be such
that it is "reasonable... to require the corporation to defend
the particular suit which is brought there."39
This focus on reasonableness led the Court to adopt a type of
balancing test of relevant factors:
[Tihe burden on the defendant,... will in an appropriate
case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,... the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective re-
lief... the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies,... "'
As part of the minimum contacts analysis, World-Wide Volks-
wagen focused on foreseeability. The Court began by pointing
out that "foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause."4 ' However, the court went on to state:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due pro-
cess analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will
find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.42
Citing Hanson v. Denckla, Justice White applied the "purpose-
ful availment" test to a case involving the failure of a product
sold in interstate commerce, and raised the later-to-be trouble-
39. Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
40. Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 295.
42. Id. at 297.
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some -phrase, "stream of commerce:"
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,"...
it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act
to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if
the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State .... The forum State does not exceed its powers under
the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over
a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State.43
Like the concept of "contacts," which was not troublesome to
the International Shoe Court because the contacts there were
viewed as clearly "systematic and continuous," the concept of a
"stream of commerce" into which the defendant intentionally
directs its goods was not troublesome to Justice White in
World-Wide Volkswagen. This was because Justice White did
not face an argument that it was the defendants who sent the
automobile on its way to Oklahoma and that the defendants
received some related benefits as a result. The car found its
way to Oklahoma, not in the course of any commercial rela-
tionship, but rather because of the conduct of the ultimate
consumer.
Two later cases, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall,)4 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal-
ifornia,45 allowed the Court to *address truly transnational
situations. In each, the Court refused to find sufficient activi-
ties to justify jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In
Helicopteros, the Court addressed a situation where the con-
tacts were neither as "systematic and continuous" as in Inter-
national Shoe, nor as limited as in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Helicopteros involved a wrongful death action that was brought
in Texas state court against a Colombian corporation (Helicol)
as the result of a helicopter crash in Peru, causing death to
four U.S. citizens and others.' The defendant corporation had
43. Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted).
44. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
45. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
46. See id. at 409-10, 412.
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sent its chief executive officer to Texas to negotiate the pur-
chase of the helicopters involved in the crash, had purchased
other helicopters and accessories there, had sent the
corporation's pilots for training there, and had sent manage-
ment personnel there for training and technical consulta-
tion.47 The Court found "that purchases and related trips,
standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State's assertion
of [general] jurisdiction."48 Ultimately, it held that the com-
bination of existing contacts did not support the constitutional
exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.4"
Asahi brought little clarity and added confusion to the
"stream of commerce" language of World-Wide Volkswagen. A
Japanese manufacturer of valve stems, Asahi, sold them to
Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, who used them as
components in tire tubes, including one that ultimately was
incorporated into a motorcycle sold and used in California."
When the driver of the motorcycle was injured in an accident,
and his passenger killed, the driver brought a products liability
claim in California.5' All defendants other than Asahi settled
with the plaintiff, and the only issue remaining was the liabili-
ty of Asahi to Cheng Shin for contribution." Asahi had not
been an original defendant, but had been impleaded by Cheng
Shin.5
3
California's long-arm statute authorized the exercise of
jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of this state or of the United States."' Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion adopted a "stream of commerce plus" ap-
proach. Thus, a consumer's unilateral action in bringing a
product into a jurisdiction would be insufficient to support
jurisdiction, and the mere insertion of a product into the
stream of commerce, absent some purposeful act availing the
defendant of the benefits of the jurisdiction, also should not
support constitutional jurisdiction. O'Connor would require "an
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
47. See id. at 411.
48. Id. at 408.
49. See id. at 418-19.
50. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987).
51. See id. at 105-06.
52. See id. at 106.
53. See id.
54. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
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State."55 This portion of the opinion, however, received the
support of only three other Justices. Four other Justices would
have allowed a simple stream of commerce rule,56 but the case
ultimately was decided by eight Justices agreeing that it was
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over this Japanese defen-
dant simply for purposes of deciding what was now a dispute
only with a Taiwanese party.5"
To a lawyer from a civil law system, accustomed to the
relative structure of code-type lists of jurisdictional rules, and
reasoning from general principles often more certain than the
concept of due process, this trip through U.S. case law must
seem rather confusing. Ultimately, however, whether the lan-
guage used is "minimum contacts," "purposeful availment,"
"stream of commerce," or any other, the test focuses on two
elements: (1) whether there is a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the forum state; and (2) whether the circum-
stances make it fair and reasonable to exercise jurisdiction."
55. Asahi Metal Industry Co., 480 U.S. at 112 (emphasis in original).
56. Justice Brennan (joined by White, Marshall and Blackmun), concurred in
the result but disagreed with the stream of commerce plus analysis of Part II-A of
Justice O'Connor's opinion:
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies,
but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
57. "Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the alien
defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would
be unreasonable and unfair." Id- at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
58. Helicopteros indicates the possibility of a third element, superimposed on
these two: the connection between the in-state activities and the cause of action. A
nexus that might be sufficient if the cause of action was closely connected to it
might not be enough if the cause of action was unrelated. Thus,
When a controversy is related to or "arises out of' a defendant's contacts
with the forum, the Court has said that a "relationship among the defen-
dant, the forum, and the litigation" is the essential foundation of in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Helicopteros was the first case in
which the Supreme Court adopted the distinction between "general jurisdiction,"
based on the systematic and continuous activities of the defendant in the forum
state, and 'specific jurisdiction," based on lesser activities in the forum state but
requiring that the cause of action have a direct connection with those activities.
This distinction had been suggested nearly twenty years earlier. See Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
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If we look at results, rather than only at language, the
picture is somewhat simpler (at least if we look only at the
Supreme Court decisions). Few now argue that the conditions
in World-Wide Volkswagen should have resulted in a finding of
jurisdiction. The distributor and retailer had no connection
with Oklahoma other than the fortuitous trip by one of their
customers through that state. While it may have been foresee-
able that some purchaser of a car in New York would drive to
Oklahoma, that is not the foreseeability of due process analy-
sis. This was not enough to make it foreseeable that a New
York dealer or wholesaler would be haled into court there.
Similarly, the number of sales persons and level of sales
by a Missouri-based company in Washington lend credence to
the reasonableness of jurisdiction in International Shoe. In
Asahi, on the other hand (leaving aside the divergent opinions
on a "stream of commerce" analysis), it seems reasonable for a
U.S. court not to take jurisdiction over a dispute that remains
only between Taiwanese and Japanese parties, especially when
the product of the Taiwanese party had reached California
only as an indirect result of the commercial chain of manufac-
ture and distribution. 9
Helicopteros may be the more difficult case. The Peruvian
corporation there had a number of contacts with the state of
Texas, and even though the cause of action (which was based
on an accident in Peru) did not arise directly out of those con-
tacts, there was at least an indirect relationship between the
purchase of helicopters in Texas, the training of pilots there,
and a crash involving those helicopters and those pilots. This
case demonstrates two factors that should provide consolation
to the foreign party worried about being hauled into U.S.
courts. The first is that the Due Process Clause clearly re-
mains a constitutional limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction
by U.S. courts. The language of due process, including "mini-
mum contacts," remains primarily jurisdiction-defeating lan-
guage.
The second factor demonstrated by Helicopteros is that the
concept of general jurisdiction serves to limit the jurisdictional
reach of courts in the due process analysis. Thus, when the
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144-64 (1966).
59. But see Slberman, supra note 8, at 401-02.
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activity sued upon does not arise out of the "minimum con-
tacts" that exist, something more than the threshold of activity
required for specific jurisdiction must be met. The activity
threshold is raised to the "systematic and continuous" level,
which has provedmore difficult to achieve. While Asahi creates
difficulty in determining the current application of a "stream of
commerce" test, it does combine with Helicopteros to indicate
that the U.S. Supreme Court won't let a foreign corporation be
sued in a state where it has limited activity unless there exists
a close connection between the cause of action and the activity.
Ill. BRUSSELS CONVENTION ARTICLE 5(3) AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome specifically directed the
original Member States of the European Economic Community
to enter into negotiations to simplify formalities governing
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments. 0 This
process began in 1959, resulting in the completion of the Brus-
sels Convention in 1968.1 The Convention has been amended
to provide for the accession of each new Member State in the
Community.
Most recognition and enforcement treaties are "simple"
treaties dealing only with the decision of the court asked to
recognize a judgment from another jurisdiction.62 This follows
the "indirect jurisdiction" approach exemplified by the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(Restatement) and Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act (Recognition Act) technique in the United States63
60. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 220, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 87, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 69 (Cmd. 5179-
II) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. Article 220 included a direction to simplify the rec-
ognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. See id. The Brussels Convention
deals only with court judgments. A separate Community treaty on arbitration
awards has been unnecessary due to the existence of the New York Arbitration
Convention, supra note 6, to which over eighty states are party.
61. See, e.g., ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., A GUIDE To THE CIVIL JURISDICTION
AND JUDGMINTS CONVENTION 3-5 (1987).
62. See von Mehren, supra note 4, at 17.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES §§ 481, 482 (1987); UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986); see also Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Mon-
ey-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Ac-
ceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 253, 265-80 (1991).
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The enforcing court does not question whether the court of
origination properly exercised its own jurisdiction. Rather the
jurisdictional analysis conducted by the enforcing court deals
only with whether the court of origination exercised jurisdic-
tion in a manner recognized as appropriate either by the recog-
nizing state or in the applicable convention.
The Brussels Convention is an example of the more com-
plex "double" treaty, providing rules of direct jurisdiction.
Thus, rather than listing only the acceptable jurisdictional
bases for a recognizable judgment, the Member States limit
from the start the jurisdictional bases available in an action
against a person domiciled in another Member State.' These
direct limits on jurisdiction are found in Title II of the Conven-
tion.65 Title III covers issues of recognition and enforcement,
providing the general rule that "[a] judgment given in a Con-
tracting State shall be recognized in the other Contracting
States without any special procedure being required."66
Like the Restatement and Recognition Act approaches in
the United States,67 the Brussels Convention tempers the
general rule of recognition with a list of defenses that justify
non-recognition. A judgment "shall not be recognized:" (1) if
recognition would be contrary to public policy in the recogniz-
ing state; (2) where it is a default judgment given without
service in sufficient time to allow preparation of a defense; (3)
if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment in a dispute
between the same parties in the recognizing state; (4) if the
judgment necessarily went beyond the civil or commercial issue
in dispute and required determination of a matter of status or
legal capacity or rights in property arising out of a matrimo-
nial relationship, wills or succession; or (5) if the judgment is
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment from a non-Contracting
State that is entitled to recognition and is on the same cause of
action and between the same parties.68
64. See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2-18.
65. See generally id. tit. H.
66. Id. art. 26.
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 27.
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A. The Bier Case
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention provides the follow-
ing rule for specific jurisdiction in tort cases: "A person domi-
ciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State,
be sued .... in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict,
in the courts for the place where the harmful event oc-
curred.6 9
The seminal case on the interpretation of Article 5(3) is
Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace° A Dutch horticultural
business and the Reinwater Foundation sued a French defen-
dant in the court of first instance at Rotterdam. The claim was
that the French concern had polluted the waters of the Rhine
by the discharge of saline waste from its operations in France,
and thus damaged the plaintiffs business, which relied on
irrigation from the Rhine river, and forced expensive measures
to prevent further damage." When the Rotterdam court held
it had no jurisdiction, and the case was appealed to the
Gerechtshof in The Hague, that court referred to the ECJ the
following question:
Are the words "the place where the harmful event occurred",
appearing in the text of Article 5 (3)... to be understood as
meaning "the place where the damage occurred (the place
where the damage took place or became apparent)" or rather
"the place where the event having the damage as its sequel
occurred (the place where the act was or was not per-
formed)"? 2
Unlike the U.S. due process focus on contacts between the
defendant and the court asserting jurisdiction, the Bier court
looked for a "particularly close connecting factor between a
dispute and the court which may be called upon to hear it,
with a view to the efficacious conduct of the proceedings."3
The court found such a connecting factor at the place where
the damage is felt as well as at the place where the event
giving rise to the damage occurred. 4 Thus, the ECJ held that,
69. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(3).
70. Case 21/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284.
71. See id. 1976 E.C.R. at 1744, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. at 299.
72. Id. 1976 E.C.R. at 1745, [19771 1 C.M.L.R. at 299.
73. Id. 1976 E.C.R. at 1746, [19771 1 C.M.L.R. at 300.
74. The Court found either place to "constitute a significant connecting factor
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in an action brought under Article 5(3), "the defendant may be
sued, at the option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for the
place where the damage occurred or in the courts for the place
of the event which gives rise to and is at the origin of that
damage."75 This was an expansive reading of Article 5(3), and
in that sense parallels the role of International Shoe in the
United States.76
B. The Post-Bier Cases
Four ECJ cases in particular have provided further elabo-
ration on the interpretation of Article 5(3) in Bier. The first of
these cases, Kalfelis v. Schrdder,7 does not comment directly
on the locus of Article 5(3) jurisdiction, but rather demon-.
strates its limited scope. Mr. Kalfelis entered into futures
transactions in silver bullion with a Luxembourg bank,
through its Frankfurt intermediary. When the transactions
resulted in a total loss for Mr. Kalfelis, he brought claims on
both contract and tort theories in Germany, and the bank
challenged jurisdiction. The decision "observed... that the
'special jurisdictions' enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the
Convention constitute derogations from the principle that juris-
diction is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant
is domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively."78
Under Kalfelis, a court cannot have jurisdiction over the same
matter both as a tort matter under Article 5(3) and as a con-
tract matter under Article 5(1). 7' This categorization of ac-
from the point of view of jurisdiction." Id.
75. Id. 1976 E.C.R. at 1749, [19771 1 C.M.L.R. at 301. One of the approaches
to Article 5(3) not adopted was the assertion of the Government of the Nether-
lands and the Commission that a choice of law analysis be applied to questions of
jurisdiction such that jurisdiction be available in the state with the "most signifi-
cant relationship" with the harmful event. While the Court's opinion provided no
need to refer directly to this argument, the opinion of Advocate General Capotorti
specifically rejected it on the basis that it was "not ... in accordance with the
objective of the Brussels Convention . . . to simplify problems relating to determi-
nation of the national court having jurisdiction." Id. 1976 E.C.R. at 1755, [1977] 1
C.M.L.R. at 294 (Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti).
76. See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
77. Case 189/87, 1988 E.C.R. 5565.
78. Id. at 5585.
79. See id. at 5585, 5587 (holding that "the concept of 'matters relating to
tort, delict and quasi-delict' covers all actions which seek to establish the liability
of a defendant and which are not related to a 'contract' within the meaning of
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tions demonstrates the primacy of the Article 2 general juris-
dictional rule and the accompanying limits on all specific juris-
dictional rules, including that for torts found in Article 5(3).
The next case to add gloss on the Bier decision is Dumez
France and Tracoba v. Hessische Landesbank.° French parent
corporations of German subsidiaries sought compensation in
France, alleging that the conduct of German banks in cancel-
ing loans to the subsidiaries brought about the insolvency of
the subsidiaries. When the lower French courts upheld the
German banks' objections to jurisdiction, the Cour de cassation
referred that matter for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The
question presented was whether the dual jurisdictional locus
allowed in Bier was "to be extended to... enable the indirect
victim to bring proceedings before the court of the State in
which he is domiciled?""l
The Dumez'court contrasted the facts in Bier with those in
Dumez. The judgment in Bier "related to a situation in which
the .damage... occurred... by the direct effect of the causal
agent, namely the saline waste which had moved physically
from one place to another."82 The ECJ noted that, in the case
presently before it,
[bly contrast,... the damage allegedly suffered by
Dumez and Oth through cancellation, by the German banks,
of the loans granted for financing the works originated and
produced its direct consequences in the same Member State,
namely the one in which the lending banks, the prime con-
tractor and the subsidiaries of Dumez and Oth, which were
responsible for the building work, were all established. The
harm alleged by the parent companies, Dumez and Oth, is
merely the indirect consequence of the financial losses initial-
ly suffered by their subsidiaries following cancellation of the
loans and the subsequent suspension of the works."
The limited nature of the Article 5(3) jurisdictional basis, and
the lack of a "particularly close connecting factor between the
Article 5 (1)" and that "[a] court which has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over an
action in so far as it is based on tort or delict does not have jurisdiction over that
action in so far as it is not so based.").
80. Case C-220/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-49.
81. Id. at 1-77.
82. Id. at 1-78.
83. Id. at 1-79.
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dispute and the courts,""' when the only harm suffered in the
state is "no more than the indirect consequence of the harm
initially suffered"' elsewhere, led to a finding of no jurisdic-
tion.
Both the Due Process Clause and the jurisdictional scheme
of the Brussels Convention serve to protect the defendant do-
miciled in a Member State. In Brussels, Article 2 first sets
forth the general rule of jurisdiction at the defendant's domi-
cile.8" Next, Article 3 prohibits jurisdiction based on certain
Member State statutes, most all of which are designed to ex-
pand jurisdiction at the forum actoris and thus unreasonably
favor the plaintiff."7 Third, the restrictive reading of all specif-
ic bases of jurisdiction limits their use to "reasons relating to
the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct
of proceedings,"8 and,
militates against any interpretation of the Convention which,
otherwise than in the cases expressly provided for, might
lead to recognition of the jurisdiction of the courts of the
plaintiff's domicile and would enable a plaintiff to determine
the competent court by his choice of domicile.89
This combination of factors responds to the necessity "to avoid
the multiplication of courts of competent jurisdiction which
would heighten the risk of irreconcilable decisions."' ° In the
end, the ECJ used the Dumez case to limit the plaintiffs op-
tion under Bier to the place where the event causing the dam-
age occurred and the place where the damage "directly pro-
duced its harmful effects upon the person who is the immedi-
ate victim of that event."9
In Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA,92 the ECJ applied the
Bier analysis to a defamation case. A French publisher of a
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
87. See id. art. 3.
88. Case C-220/88, Dumez France and Tracoba, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-80.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. "[W]hilst the place where the initial damage manifested itself is usual-
ly closely related to the other components of the liability, in most cases the domi-
cile of the indirect victim is not so related." Id.
92. Case C-68/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-415.
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newspaper distributed primarily in France published an article
about a U.K. national involving her alleged conduct while
employed for a summer in Paris. When the individual and her
French employer sued for defamation in England, where the
law establishes a presumption of damage in libel cases, the
French publisher challenged jurisdiction. The House of Lords
referred the matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the
application of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. The ECJ
found that the analysis in Bier,
made in relation to physical or pecuniary loss or damage,
must equally apply, for the same reasons, in the case of loss
or damage other than physical or pecuniary, in particular
injury to the reputation and good name of a natural or legal
person due to a defamatory publication.93
The place of the event giving rise to the damage could only be
the place where the publisher is established, and the courts of
that state have jurisdiction "for all of the harm caused by the
unlawful act."' The place where the damage occurred, on the
other hand, "is the place where the event ... produced its
harmful effects upon the victim."95
While suit can be brought in a defamation action in either
jurisdiction, the ECJ held that only the court of the publisher's
establishment could award damages for all the harm. In other
states, damages can be awarded only for the injury caused in
the forum state to the plaintiffs reputation. Thus, the disad-
vantage of having different courts ruling on various aspects of
the same dispute is possible, but "the plaintiff always has the
option of bringing his entire claim before the courts either of
the defendant's domicile or of the place where the publisher of
the defamatory publication is established."5
93. Id. at 1-460.
94. Id. at 1-461.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1-462. The ECJ elaborated as follows:
[Tihe victim of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Con-
tracting States may bring an action for damages against the publisher
either before the courts of the Contracting State of the place where the
publisher of the defamatory publication is established, which have juris-
diction to award damages for all the harm caused by the defamation, or
before the courts of each Contracting State in which the publication was
distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his
reputation, which have jurisdiction to rule solely in respect of the harm
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In 1995, the ECJ decided Marinari v. Lloyds Bank.97 Mr.
Marinari, an Italian domiciliary, was arrested as the result of
a referral to the police by the Manchester branch of Lloyds
Bank when he had lodged with them promissory notes issued
by a province of the Republic of the Philippines in favor of a
Beirut company with an exchange value of US $752.5 mil-
lion.9" When Marinari was released and returned to Italy, he
brought suit for the exchange value of the notes that were not
returned, and for compensation for damages suffered as a
result of his arrest and damage to his reputation.9 9 The bank
objected to jurisdiction in the Italian court, and the matter
ultimately was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling by
the Corte suprema di Cassazione.'00
The ECJ reiterated its concern that an extension of the
Bier principle would be contrary to the general principles of
the Brussels Convention.'' Thus, the term "'place where the
harmful event occurred," although it covers "both the place
where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving
rise to it," has limits. °2 According to the ECJ, "that term
cannot be construed as including the place where, as in the
present case, the victim claims to have suffered financial dam-
age following upon initial damage arising and suffered by him
in another Contracting State."' 3 Thus, the extension of juris-
diction begun in Bier is limited to direct damage in the juris-
caused in the State of the court seised.
Id.
97. Case C-364193, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2719.
98. See id. at 1-2721.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1-2739. Specifically, the court stated:
The choice thus available to the plaintiff cannot however be extended
beyond the particular circumstances which justify it. Such an extension
would negate the general principle laid down in the first paragraph of
Article 2 of the Convention that the courts of the Contracting State
where the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction. It would lead,
in cases other than those expressly provided for, to recognition of the
jurisdiction of the courts of the plaintiffs domicile, a solution which the
Convention does not favour since, in the second paragraph of Article 3, it
excludes application of national provisions which make such jurisdiction
available for proceedings against defendants domiciled in the territory of
a Contracting State.
Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1-2740.
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diction in which the initial damage is suffered.
C. Summarizing the Language of Tort Jurisdiction Under
Article 5(3)
The language developed in Bier and its progeny to address
the scope of Article 5(3) tort jurisdiction is both similar to and
different from that developed in International Shoe and subse-
quent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning with "'the
place where the harmful event occurred,'" we find the exten-
sion to a plaintiffs option between "'the place where the dam-
age occurred" and "the place where the event having the dam-
age as its sequel occurred.'"'" In Dumez, we see the empha-
sis on a "particularly close connecting factor between the dis-
pute and [the] courts,""5 and we come upon "indirect conse-
quences" and the "indirect victim."' Ultimately, we see the
other side of the coin, expressed as the "direct effect of the
causal agent," and the place where the damage "directly pro-
duced its harmful effects upon the person who is the imme-
diate victim of that event," in Dumez.'°7 Shevill adds concepts
of "sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct
of proceedings,"' and in Marinari, we find further limitation
in the language, "financial damage consequential upon initial
damage."0 9
IV. CROSS-CURRENTS OR CROSS-PURPOSES: RECONCILING DUE
PROCESS WITH "THE STATE WHERE THE HARMFUL EVENT
OCCURRED"
For a continental, civil law lawyer, the expansive aspect of
Bier may seem unsurprising. There is logic in allowing suit
where the harm is actually felt. While evidence of the
defendant's conduct must be brought from outside the state in
which the case will be heard, the evidence of damage will be
within the jurisdiction, and both are necessary elements of an
104. Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1745,
[1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284, 299 (1976).
105. Case C-220/88, Dumez France and Tracba v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990
E.C.R. 1-49, 1-79.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1-80.
108. Case C-68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. 1-415, 1-459.
109. Case C-364/93, Marinari v. Lloyds Bank, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2719, 1-2740.
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action in tort."' To an American more accustomed to the ju-
risprudence of due process, the decision in Bier raises obvious
questions. The focus of our Supreme Court's decisions applying
due process to questions of jurisdiction generally has not been
on the connection between the court and the cause of ac-
tion."' That is more often the subject of provisions of a "list
type" state long-arm statute." The due process focus is rath-
er on the nexus between the defendant and the court claiming
jurisdiction. This connection was not discussed in the Bier
decision.
Both due process jurisprudence and the jurisdictional
scheme of the Brussels Convention are based on the concept of
protection of the defendant. Each is viewed by the principal
court interpreting it as limiting the jurisdictions in which a
defendant may be sued. With the Brussels Convention, this is
accomplished in a three step process: (1) the basic rule of Arti-
cle 2 provides that suit may be brought at the place of the
defendant's domicile;". (2) Article 3 then prevents jurisdic-
tion over Community defendants on the basis of exorbitant,
plaintiff-friendly rules;"4 and (3) the specific jurisdictional
rules contained in the remainder of Title H of the Convention
(particularly those in Articles 5 and 6) are interpreted restric-
tively, to avoid jurisdiction in multiple locations."'
Due process analysis also allows -suit at the defendant's
place of domicile," 6 assuming of course that service of process
results in actual notice. The limitations that follow are not as
neatly catalogued as is the case in the Brussels Convention.
Rather, we must rely on the language of a series of U.S. Su-
110. See Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735,
1746, [19771 1 C.M.L.R. 284, 300 (1976) ("Liability in tort, delict or quasi-delict
can only arise provided that a causal connexion can be established between the
damage and the event in which that damage originates.").
111. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court did use language
implicating this relationship, when it referred to the importance of "the relation-
ship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" as "the central concern of
the inquiry into personal jurisdiction." Id. at 204. The focus, particularly in regard
to general jurisdiction, has been on the relationship between the defendant and
the court.
112. See supra note 10.
113. See Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
114. See id. art. 3.
115. See id. arts. 5-6.
116. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
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preme Court decisions that demonstrate the flexibility of the
common law.
. Another similarity at this point is that both courts have
chosen to define the basic concepts they are applying in terms
of connecting factors. Article 5(3) will not provide jurisdiction
except where there is a connection between the court and the
dispute. Further, this connection must be direct, not indirect,
and must relate to the harm initially suffered, rather than only
some consequential harm. The connection in due process analy-
sis lies between the court and the defendant. Thus the defen-
dant-protection nature of the scheme of jurisdiction is more
directly implicated in this aspect of the due process test than
in the formulation of the Brussels test under Article 5(3).
A clear example of the difference between the analysis in
Bier and U.S. due process analysis arises by applying the Bier
analysis to the facts in World-Wide Volkswagen."' Taking
the Bier test literally, if U.S. states operated under a Brussels
Convention system, rather than the Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, then a defective
automobile causing an accident and injury in Oklahoma could
lead to a case being brought: (1) at the domicile of the defen-
dant under Article 2; (2) at the place where the automobile
was manufactured (the event giving rise to the damage) under
Article 5(3); or (3) at the place of the accident (the place where
the damage occurred), all at the option of the plaintiff.
Thus, the literal language of the Bier decision would have
allowed jurisdiction in Oklahoma over the New York distribu-
tor and retailer. This application of Bier to the facts of World-
Wide Volkswagen demonstrates the jurisdiction limiting func-
tion of the Due Process Clause. The clause operates to restrict
the plaintiffs choice of forum and thus protects the defendant.
As the post-Bier cases demonstrate, there is a similar defen-
dant-protection element in the structure of the Brussels Con-
vention. Not only does Article 2 make the general rule jurisdic-
tion in the state of domicile of the defendant, but Article 3
explicitly protects Community defendants from exorbitant,
plaintiff-friendly jurisdictional bases otherwise available in the
117. A similar analysis of the facts of Asahi indicates that countries such as
Italy, England and Japan would likely have assumed jurisdiction there where the
U.S. Supreme Court found it inappropriate under a due process analysis. See
Silberman, supra note 8, at 401-02.
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Member States, and the principle of restrictive interpretation
of the specific bases of jurisdiction that follow in Title II of the
Convention further limits the availability of other forums to a
plaintiff subject to the Convention.
While the language of the European cases focuses on the
court's connection with the dispute, the rationale supporting
that language focuses on the protection of the defendant. Thus,
it is the lack of connection with the defendant (especially the
lack of domicile of the defendant) that is the foundation for the
post-Bier limitations on Article 5(3) jurisdiction. Like Interna-
tional Shoe in the United States, the Bier decision provided an
apparent expansion of jurisdiction over foreign defendants.
Both seem justified by aspects of modern society, whether it be
the mobility of persons, the contacts of corporations with multi-
ple states, or the consequences of modern commercial activity
on a river that flows through more than one state. Like World-
Wide Volkswagen, the post-Bier cases have demonstrated the
limitations on that jurisdictional reach.
What we do not find in the language of the European
cases are references to concepts of foreseeability. It is possible,
perhaps, to describe the rules on both sides of the Atlantic in
terms of: (1) contacts; and (2) fairness or reasonableness. While
we are told that foreseeability is not the sole determinant in
the United States, we are told that it is important."8 We are
not explicitly told that it has any role in the tort jurisdiction
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Yet, it seems that the apparent prob-
lematic extensions of Bier, suggested above, can be tempered
by a simple foreseeability gloss on that case. Certainly it was
foreseeable on the Bier facts that one who dumps large quan-
tities of saline into the Rhine river in France might be sued for
damage caused when the water contaminated by the act was
used for horticultural irrigation in the Netherlands; more fore-
seeable, for example, than that a New York auto dealer who
sold an automobile to a New York resident in New York could
be sued in Oklahoma for an accident involving that car that
occurred in Oklahoma. The foreseeability in Bier was more
than a possibility; it was a high probability. Contaminants put
into the Rhine in France were likely to find their way to Hol-
land and so should a resulting lawsuit. On the other hand, the
118. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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foreseeability in World-Wide Volkswagen was at best a mere
possibility, and not a probability.
V. CONCLUSIONS FOR A MULTILATERAL JUDGMENTS
CONVENTION
What conclusions, if any, can we draw from all this for a
multilateral judgments convention? Can a tort jurisdiction
provision build on similarities of language and concepts be-
tween the U.S. due process analysis for jurisdictional purposes
and the ECJ's interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention? I think it can. While I will not recommend specific
language here, there are several goals the provision should
help achieve and at least two more specific aspects of the pro-
vision that may be suggested.
In terms of goals, the provision should combine with oth-
ers to avoid the possibility of conflicting judgments. This will
depend in part on the convention's approach to the question of
lis pendens, but the bases of specific jurisdiction must also
coordinate to avoid the possibility of multiple courts being
seized of the same case. A second goal of the provision should
be flexibility of application. The Bier decision and its progeny
in Europe indicate the need for reasoned development of Arti-
cle 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. The Hague Convention
provision on tort jurisdiction should similarly avoid rigid for-
mulations that are unreasonably inclusive or exclusive in na-
ture."9 A third goal should be a focus on direct injury when
the court addressed is not that of the defendant's domicile or
habitual residence. The ECJ's limitation of Article 5(3) juris-
diction for all damages to the state in which direct injury oc-
curs is a rational limitation, consistent with the goal of avoid-
ing conflicting judgments and providing reasonable protection
of defendants.
The tort provision in the Hague Convention should set
forth a jurisdictional test that includes two specific aspects,
both of which should facilitate the three goals set forth above.
First, the language should require a connection between the
defendant and the forum state. This will satisfy both the U.S.
Due Process Clause and the test under Article 5(3) of the Brus-
119. This is another reason for preferring a mixed convention approach. See
generally von Mehren, supra note 4.
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sels Convention. While it may appear to go beyond the current
jurisprudence under Article 5(3), it is at least arguable that the
connection between the court and the dispute that is important
in the analysis of the ECJ is satisfied by and reasonably paral-
lel to the connection between the' court and the defendant. If
we are to take seriously the ECJ's statements on the impor-
tance of protecting the defendant in the Brussels scheme of
jurisdiction, then this approach certainly makes sense." Sec-
ond, the provision must encompass some concept of foreseeabil-
ity of litigation. While the result in Bier does not "offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice," a literal
extension of the language of that case would do so. Tempering
its extension through a requirement of foreseeability of suit (in
the nature of probability rather than possibility) would leave
the Bier-type results intact, but avoid exorbitant exten-
sions-consistent with the limitations on Bier found in subse-
quent European case law. This factor may also serve to fit the
reasonableness and fairness element of the International
Shoe/World-Wide Volkswagen/Asahi line of cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court. Jurisdiction that by its nature is foreseeable,
is unlikely to be unreasonable.
The problem, of course, will be in finding appropriate lan-
guage (in both English and French) to take account of these
factors. That I leave for the parties at the Hague Conference
on Private International Law.
120. If we consider specific jurisdiction in the terms of U.S. decisions such as
Helicopteros, then the relationship between the jurisdiction and the cause of action
is important also in U.S. law. The court will consider the extent to which the
cause of action arises out of the activities of the defendant in the forum state in
order to exercise specific, rather than general, jurisdiction. See supra note 58.
Thus, U.S. concepts of specific jurisdiction are described in language relatively
similar to the ECJs discussion of the relationship between the court and the dis-
pute.
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